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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that economics exhibits the properties of both moral 
science and value-free technique, thereby establishing a dualist view on the two 
identities of economics. This duality is implied by the fundamental logic of the 
economic way of thinking − investigating human behavior upon the means-end 
rationality principle. In this view, on the one hand, economics behaves as a moral 
science for two reasons: all economic theories and policy discussions are necessarily 
based on some moral premises about means-end considerations; economics as an 
analytical approach can be and has been applied to explanations of a wide range of 
ethical issues. On the other hand, economics remains neutral regarding judgmental 
positions. This is because economists cannot deal with the comparisons and choices 
among different value criteria, unless some ethical presuppositions of higher order are 
given to them. Therefore, economics is indeed featured by both morality and value 
neutrality.  
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1. Introduction 
Economics has a doubtful origin: ‘ethics’ and/or ‘engineering’ (see Sen, 1987). 
The former deals with human ends and values, whereas the latter is viewed as a mere 
technique neutral to different moral positions. In fact, many practitioners of the 
‘dismal science’ have long been struggling with making an either/or choice between 
these two options. For those who believe that economics is originated from ethics, the 
discipline still remains a branch of it, because “(economics) employs introspection 
and judgments of value” (Keynes, 1938); and even “no science of any kind can be 
divorced from ethical considerations” (Boulding,1969, p.2). However, for those who 
emphasize the ‘engineering’ aspect of economics, their discipline and ethics “are not 
on the same plane of discourse” (Robbins, 1935, p.148); and although economic study 
is surely for “the bettering of human life” (Pigou, 1920, p. vii), the welfare in 
economics only refers to “that part of social welfare that can be brought directly or 
indirectly into relation with the measuring-rod of money ” (p.11).
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More recently, this long-lasting methodological debate about the origin(s) and 
identity of economics has been reignited in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
which dramatically worsened the living standards of billions of people across the 
globe. In this context, welfare economics and some related ethical issues have come 
to the center of the post-crisis methodological rethinking. This is especially the case 
for distributive justice, business ethics, and relationship between efficiency and equity 
(see, among others, Posner, 2009, Atkinson, 2011, Bhagwati, 2011, Friedman, 2011, 
Shiller and Shiller, 2011, Stiglitz, 2012, and Piketty, 2013). 
Nonetheless, on the basis of the belief that morality and value neutrality are 
mutually exclusive, most studies on the topic systematically contradict economics as a 
moral science with economics as a value-free approach. In this paper, we attempt to 
call into question this ‘identity’ dichotomy, which according to us stems from 
misunderstanding the fundamental logic of the subject, namely theorizing upon the 
principle of means-end rationality. Holding this principle is an essential, but often 
latent, property common to all approaches relying on the economic way of thinking − 
from the neoclassical school to behavioral economics – regardless of how they differ 
in the concrete empirical content of the ‘means’ and ‘ends.’ This methodological 
heartland leads to a dualist view about the morality and value neutrality in economics. 
On the one hand, economics behaves as a moral science: it is not just because all 
theorizing and policy discussions in economics are necessarily based on certain moral 
premises, but also because economics as an approach of analysis to human behavior 
can be and has been used to answer a wide range of moral questions. On the other 
hand, economics remains a value-free science. It is because without certain ethical 
                                                        
2 Also see Hawtrey (1925), Samuelson (1947), and Stigler (1981). In addition, Hausman and McPherson (1993) 
provides a review of literature on the relationship between economics and ethics. 
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presuppositions, economists have no professional competence to deal with the 
comparisons and choices among different value criteria and moral norms, which are 
assumed to be justified as ends for their own sake. In proposing such a reconciliation 
of the two identities of economics, we provide new insights into the ways in which 
economics, ethics, and engineering are linked, thereby contributing to the related 
methodological discussions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the means-end 
rationality principle which is fundamental to revealing the dual identity of economics: 
both as a moral science and as a value-free engineering technique. Section 3 addresses 
the moral dimension of economics, and explores how ethical principles guide 
economics and how economics, in return, contributes to understanding ethical issues. 
Section 4 turns to the engineering dimension of economics, and shows that the 
discipline remains, however, neural regarding judgmental positions in the sense that 
certain kinds of moral premises and value criteria should be given prior to economic 
inquiries. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
  
2. Rationality principle and economic inquires 
According to Robbins’ definition of economics (Robbins, 1935, pp.16), 
economic inquiries are essentially concerned with how the available means can be 
allocated to achieve an end which is given a priori
3
. In other words, economics is a 
study about the aspect of human behavior that can be read as an outcome of 
means-end consideration. In much the same spirit, Becker (1976) later argued that the 
assumption of maximizing behavior, among others, forms “the heart of the economic 
approach” (pp.4), thereby proposing a definition of economics equally based on its 
method of analysis. Of course, there are also many others who define economics 
differently, such as by subject-matter
4
, they are indeed not fundamentally at odds with 
Robbins’ analytical definition (to some extent, also Becker’s): even if economists may 
only focus on some particular classes of social phenomenon and human behavior, they 
should necessarily rely on a special cognitive instrument, which is nothing but the 
economic way of thinking. This instrument, by common understanding, is 
self-evidently founded on the principle of means-end rationality
5
. As a matter of fact, 
                                                        
3 In his original text, Robbins (1935) uses the plural ‘ends’ rather than the singular ‘end.’ However, in a specific 
research project, economists cannot deal with several ends without additional information, unless they are 
intermediary or instrumental ends, which can be measured by some common metric, to achieve an ultimate or 
intrinsic end.  
4 For example, classical theorist Jean-Baptiste Say (1832) defined ‘political economy’ as a science that “unfolds 
the manner in which wealth is produced, distributed, and consumed”; Institutional economists such as Buchanan 
(1964) and Coase (1978) place emphasis on the market system and related institutional arrangements as the 
subject-matter by which economics is defined. It is to note that the debate about the definitions of economics is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers are referred to Backhouse and Medema (2009) for further 
discussion.  
5 Since other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and biology, may also rest on some versions of the 
rationality principle, and thus holding the latter does not offer a sufficient condition to define economics. 
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once we stretch the connotation of the terms ‘means’ and ‘end’ to accommodate 
various so-called ‘behavioral anomalies’ and other ‘nonmaterial’ concerns, this 
principle of rationality is shared, explicitly or implicitly, with all economic 
approaches and schools of thought, as long as they do not abandon the economic way 
of thinking when inquiring into human choices and trade-offs.  
With this understanding in mind, the argument logically follows that economics 
is a study about ‘rational’ choices. Here the term ‘rational’ seems confusing and 
should be taken in its broader sense. It does not mean that people always make the 
best choice that leads to the highest level of material satisfaction. In reality, of course, 
people often make wrong decisions on the one hand, and also pursue non-material 
satisfaction on the other. Instead, by ‘rational’ we simply mean that from an economic 
point of view, all human actions and choices are motivated (or as if motivated) by 
some ends and subjected to some constraints. Hence, they are regarded by economists 
as the outcomes of certain kinds of means-end reasoning, no matter what the means 
and ends are. At this juncture, it is worth quoting Becker again who wrote that “it (the 
economic approach) is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular 
motivations” (Becker, 1996, pp.139). In this light, for example, if an investor, who 
wants to make as much profit as possible (and wants nothing else), loses money in 
his/her investment, it simply suggests that the behavior of this investor is constrained 
by his/her cognitive capacity, knowledge, willpower and so forth.   
Unfortunately, the above logic may be so obvious that economists do not notice 
it anymore, especially when they are fooled by the very different empirical 
appearances of the means and ends. In particular, it is not uncommon to equate 
Robbins’ definition with neoclassical economics, which bears essentially on 
self-material interests and resource/technique constraints. For example, as a leading 
philosopher of economics, Daniel Hausman argued, economics as defined by Robbins 
refers to, in effect, neoclassical theory, and thus, it excludes Keynesian theory 
(Hausman, 2008, pp.32). Nonetheless, this holds if and only if, at the very beginning, 
we restrict the means-end considerations to those in the sense of neoclassical 
economics, even though there is no logical reason to prevent us from doing differently: 
why can we not treat ‘sense of achievement’ as a variable affecting the utility of 
investors? Why can we not consider ‘computational capacity’ and ‘information,’ along 
with ‘budget,’ as constraints to which consumers are subject? Why can we not take 
‘fairness’ into account when exploring the players’ choices in ‘ultimatum’ game? All 
these questions are not only legitimate, but also reflective of the fundamental 
approach to human understanding that economists use every day, with or more often 
without their own consciousness. In awakening this kind of self-consciousness, we 
realize that it is Hausman rather than Robbins, who excludes non-neoclassical theories 
from Robbins’ ‘economics.’ 
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To further clarify our point, the table below shows that although both 
neoclassical economics and one of its major ‘rivals,’ behavioral economics, differ in 
what the maximization goals and constraints are considered, they can be reduced to a 
single form of inquiry (or, a single conceptual scheme), namely constrained 
maximization framework. The latter is interpreted in the broader sense described 
above, and thus is not restricted for explicit mathematical optimization. Also, it should 
be noted that the empirical contents for the two approaches do complement, rather 
than substitute for each other. For example, in the real life most individuals are 
concerned not only with their own material interests, but also, to a different extent, 
with those of others.  
 
Table 1: Comparison between Neoclassical Economics and Behavioral 
Economics  
Items Neoclassical Economics Behavioral Economics 
Explanatory variables 
affecting utility function 
Self-material interests such as 
consumption, profit, wage, and 
monetary rewards… 
Moral enjoyment and 
psychological needs such as 
sense of fairness, sympathy for 
others, self-actualization…  
Constraints Budget, production capacity, 
resources, technology… 
Moral commitment, 
information, limits of 
reasoning and computational 
capacity, willpower… 
 
Importantly, understanding the principle of means-end rationality as a common 
feature shared by various economic theories is not a digression, but instead a key to 
deal with the topic of this paper. The above argumentation indeed helps us know how 
economic inquiries have been pursued: they necessarily start with, at least at the heart 
of economists, some presuppositions about the ends and means involved in the social 
phenomena and human behavior. The reality or ‘goodness’ of these presuppositions 
has simply been put beyond question for a specific research project. Although it is 
perfectly legitimate for economists to further investigate the causes of the goals and 
behavioral constraints, this kind of endeavor should, again, build on other 
presuppositions and be addressed in a new research agenda. Once we understand the 
way economic inquiries go, the dualist view on the identity of economics naturally 
follows.  
 
3. Economics as a moral science  
We first deal with the moral dimension of economics. Roughly speaking, there 
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are four major arguments supporting the identity of economics as a moral science.  
The first is fairly straightforward: the end motivating the behavior of economic 
agents reflects their ethical positions about the goals, desires, preferences, and other 
value concerns. In particular, from an economic point of view, the sense of sympathy, 
feeling of fairness, religious beliefs, and other nonmaterial factors serve as the 
determinants of the level of utility (broadly defined) which people seek to maximize. 
Importantly, some may not be aware that the neoclassical hypothesis about the utility 
function is indeed also a latent value assumption in itself: it basically says that 
economic agents are only concerned with their own material welfare, such as profit, 
consumption, wage, and other monetary payoff.  
Second, a less uncontentious argument is that some ethical concerns and moral 
principles also take the form of constraints affecting human conduct. Generally 
speaking, they prevent people from making the choices that are believed as morally 
wrong, even if these choices can yield a higher degree of satisfaction, judged from 
one perspective or another. In this regard, it is particularly noteworthy that the 
‘commitment’ proposed by Sen (1977), which does not help ‘the pursuit of one’s own 
utility,’ can be understood as a case of moral constraint on human behavior. The 
reason for that is quite unequivocal: according to our discussion in Section 2, if a 
relevant factor is assumed not to affect the end of behavior – or equivalently, it does 
not enter the utility function, it should necessarily belong to the set of behavioral 
constraints. Otherwise, it is no longer relevant. Notably, that is not an empirical matter 
but a necessary implication from the fundamental logic of economic way of thinking. 
However, it seems that Sen himself did not realize this logic hidden in his 
argumentation.  
Third, the role of morality in guiding economic inquiries appears to be more 
evident in normative economics: all welfare judgments and relevant policy 
recommendations build necessarily on the value criteria and theories of justice that are 
adopted by economists. In this view, the disagreements in welfare topics − say, from 
taxing the super-rich to stopping environmental dumpling − often spring from the 
different, or even opposing ethical positions held by the people at issue. Consequently, 
policy questions can hardly ever be resolved by logical reasoning and/or by describing 
facts
6
. Instead, to attain a higher level of some predefined public well-being, one 
should have recourse to persuasion and communication in the hope of mending the 
desires, preferences, as well as moral constraints of the people who face decision 
problems. In particular, as discussed in Section 2, in the eyes of economists, if a 
policy maker chooses policy A rather than B, the only legitimate explanation for this 
                                                        
6 In a sense, this argument corresponds to some sorts of non-cognitivist meta-ethical theories, such as emotivism of 
A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson and prescriptivism of R. M. Hare. In general, they assert that moral principles are 
not based on facts and logic, but emotional attitudes and other subjective factors. For further discussion, see 
Hodgson (2001). 
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choice is that policy A is the outcome of his/her maximizing strategy, given the latter’s 
means-end considerations (or maximization goals and constraints). Therefore, if an 
economist believes policy B is better than A and thus wants to recommend it, he/she 
should change the empirical content of the policy maker’s rationality insofar as policy 
B appears as the outcome of the latter’s new maximizing strategy. Otherwise, the 
recommendation for policy B is doomed to fail. Once again, we should stress that this 
is not an empirical argument, but rather a logical inference derived from the economic 
way of thinking
7
.      
As a final point, economics can also be viewed as a moral science in light of its 
imperialist expansion into the traditional domain of the latter. As a matter of fact, 
following the pioneering efforts of Gary Becker and many others (see Becker, 1976, 
1996; Stigler and Becker, 1977; Hirshleifer, 1985), the research line under the heading 
of ‘economic imperialism’ has successfully provided economic explanations for the 
emergence and survival of preferences, values, social norms, ideological favors, 
business ethics, and other ethical aspects of human conduct in relation to the relevant 
social and natural environments. In doing so, economists no longer treat these moral 
factors and phenomena as ‘exogenous’ givens
8
, but account for them through 
‘economic approach’ that builds essentially on the assumption of maximizing 
behavior. 
 
4. Economics as a value-free science 
Nonetheless, the close interlink between economics and morality is not at odds 
with the discipline’s value neutrality. That is to say, economic inquiries should be 
necessarily based on some a priori means-end considerations which definitely bear on 
ethics. In this light, the value neutrality of economics can be justified by the logic that 
once these premises are given beforehand as ‘explanantia,’ their empirical reality and 
moral rightness or wrongness have been put beyond discussion. However, there is no 
logical reason to prevent the latter from being the objects of other inquires (namely as 
‘explananda’), either within or without the field of economics.   
To better articulate our thoughts, let us look at two societies, a and b. Society a is 
very unequal in terms of income distribution but even the poorest person there can 
make 5000 dollars each year. Society b is composed of individuals with equal annual 
income, say 4000 dollars. Then, if you ask an economist, keeping other things 
constant, which society is better to live in? The most likely answer would be: It all 
depends on your value criteria. If a bigger (smaller) enough weight is given to the 
absolute income than to the ‘desire for equality’ in your utility function, society a 
                                                        
7 In this sense, economics, especially normative economics, might be regarded as a kind of persuasive advertising. 
8 By the same token, in doing so economists no longer stick to the maxim ‘de gustibus non est disputandum’－ 
namely ‘there is no arguing about tastes.’ 
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(society b) will be your choice. Or, if you take the moral commitment to choose a 
more equal society, regardless of your own material situation
9
, there will be no other 
choice than going to society b subject to this behavioral constraint. In this view, 
economic approach remains completely neutral regarding your choices and the 
means-end considerations behind them. 
A second example may help to further illustrate our point: When we ask ‘what is 
the ‘optimal’ Gini coefficient for a society?’ logically, it is always followed by another 
question like, ‘optimal in which sense?’ There are surely a number of candidate 
criteria: a certain level of Gini coefficient can be seen as ‘optimal’ in the sense that 
other things being equal, it can lead to the highest economic growth rate, or longest 
average life expectancy, or lowest crime rate, etc. But how should we choose and 
weight these different criteria of optimality which correspond to different ends? 
Obviously, to deal with this new question, we further need an a priori criterion that 
allows the comparison of these candidates. Then, the latter should be reduced to some 
intermediary or instrumental ends to achieve a single intrinsic end of higher order
10
. 
In other words, some common metric is needed to measure those candidate criteria or 
intermediary ends at the same time, thereby making the comparison possible. Yet, 
there is a cautionary note that any particular end, like ‘desire for equality,’ should not 
always be taken as intrinsic. The reasoning above would indeed continue until the 
investigators are, more or less reluctantly, satisfied with certain kinds of ‘free’ 
argument. The latter may be borrowed from other disciplines including ethics, or even 
be given arbitrarily. Here, ‘free’ merely means that it is taken for granted and we don’t 
ask why about it in a particular paper, book, and research project.  
Unfortunately, in the relevant literature the value neutrality of economics has 
been widely misinterpreted as an argument that the formations of values, norms, and 
tastes are always put beyond question by economists. For example, in his 1969 paper, 
Kenneth Boulding ironically referred to one illusion of economists as the ‘Immaculate 
Conception of the Indifference Curve.’ By that term, Boulding basically refers to the 
belief shared by some economists that the tastes of economic agents are simply given 
and the question of how they are formed is beyond their profession. Here, we by no 
means claim that Boulding’s irony is entirely irrelevant. Instead, our attitude toward 
this issue is ‘yes and no.’ On the one hand, following Boulding’s argument, we claim 
that economists not only need to but also have plenty of analytical tools to inquire into 
the process of the taste/value/preference formation in order to deal with questions like 
‘why does an indifference curve look like this rather than that?’ Indeed, as mentioned 
above, under the heading of economic imperialism, the applications of economic 
approach to ethical issues have already been yielding some findings of great 
                                                        
9 ‘Commitment’ is as described in Sen (1977); also see Section 3 of the current paper. 
10 Also see footnote 3 of this paper about the Robbins’ definition of economics. 
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significance. On the other hand however, economics cannot start with nothing but 
necessarily with some presuppositions about the goals and constraints which frame 
human conduct. These presuppositions should be taken for granted, or, to use 
Boulding’s words, to be ‘immaculately conceived.’ In economic inquiries, they indeed 
play a role as the first mover that gets the ball rolling (also see Hausman, 2012, 
chapter 6).  
Accordingly, in light of the analogy of the first mover, it turns out that economics 
remains a neutral instrument to explore the consequences and implications of certain 
moral premises and value criteria we hold beforehand. There are, however, two 
caveats: the first one concerns the statement that every economic inquiry necessarily 
comes out of some presuppositions. It does not mean that the latter are morally 
justified by the economists who rely on them. Instead, these presuppositions are 
exogenously given in a specific context. But can economists answer the question of 
what are the morally right premises and value judgments? Generally speaking, our 
response should be ‘no.’ The reason is that in order to judge we should have recourse 
to other criteria for judgment about the moral rightness or wrongness of behavior, 
which are prior to our inquiry. The second caveat concerns the purpose of economics. 
According to common understanding, the subject is, as already quoted, for “the 
bettering of human life” (Pigou, 1920, p. vii). However, its identity as a value-free 
technique implies that we cannot know this purpose by solely doing economics, just 
like we cannot know the purpose of physics by solely doing physics. Both are indeed 
metaphysical (if not religious) questions that are beyond the scope of economics and 
physics respectively. In this light, if economics is used for some evil purposes (for 
example, designing an intentional inflation to steal people’s savings), the discipline 
per se is not to blame for that.  
By providing these caveats we touch on the epistemological limitation of the 
economic way of thinking, which is delimited by the principle of means-end 
rationality. In short, economists cannot know the moral significance underlying 
resource allocations, market relationships, and any other traits of human conduct and 
social institutions until some presuppositions about means-end considerations are 
given to them for free. Here, we hasten to stress that just like every scientific 
discipline – including natural sciences which rely also on some prior principles, 
axioms, or ‘ultimate givens’ (such as the assumption of the existence of physical laws), 
economics is not an exception. Importantly, the recognition of this kind of ‘limit of 
knowing’ or ‘professional incompetence’ due to the division of theoretical labor is not 
a shame but a good starting point for a call-for-collaboration with other disciplines, 
especially ethics.    
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5. Conclusions 
For centuries, although no one denies that economics is closely entwined with 
both ethics and engineering, many, if not most, economists are inclined to draw a 
sharp dichotomy between the two identities of economics − as a moral science and as 
a value-free approach. In essence, this dichotomy is the result of the belief that the 
morality and value neutrality are mutually exclusive, and thus they cannot be used 
together for featuring the discipline. In our view, however, this common belief rests 
on misunderstanding the fundamental logic of the economic way of thinking. The 
latter can be summarized as observing and theorizing human behavior through the 
lens of the rationality principle.  
It should be emphasized that holding this principle is not for the need of realism, 
and thus it goes beyond empirical justification; nor is it for mathematical convenience, 
and thus it holds regardless of whether formal mathematical optimization techniques 
are used. Instead, it is just the a priori common grammar of economic analyses that 
determines how economists understand their subject-matter: no matter what analytical 
frameworks and hypotheses are taken, the choices and tradeoffs of economic agents 
can be understood by economists if and only if they are reduced to the outcomes of 
means-end considerations of certain kinds; by the same token, social norms, 
institutions, and market relationships can be understood if and only if they are reduced 
to the outcomes of the choices and interactions of the aforementioned ‘rational’ agents. 
As already stated, the above arguments are not inconsistent with the fact that different 
empirical contents of the means-end rationality have been combined with the general 
structure of the economic way of thinking. 
Importantly, being aware of this common grammar leads us to the reconciliation 
of the morality with value neutrality in economics. However different these two 
features appear, they are indeed nothing but the two sides of the same coin. On the 
one hand, economics is a moral science not only because all theorizing and policy 
discussions in economics are necessarily based on certain moral premises about the 
means-end structure of the agents; it is also because economists have provided, from 
the standpoint of their discipline, explanations for a wide range of moral issues, 
including preference formation and the development of social norms. On the other 
hand, economics remains, however, neutral regarding judgmental positions and value 
systems. This is because, without ethical presuppositions, economists cannot judge 
and evaluate the human choices in which different value criteria or intrinsic ends are 
involved.  
Furthermore, some may still be reluctant to accept the dualist view that the 
morality and value neutrality are two inseparable features, coexisting in the very same 
body. To a large extent, this avenue of understanding is reminiscent of the long 
struggle with the ‘duality paradox’ of light. Today, the latter is no longer paradoxical 
11 
 
for most, if not all, physicists, because quantum mechanics tells us that light behaves 
both as a wave and as a particle. In light of ‘light,’ there is nothing unbelievable that 
economics, as its methodological heartland implies, behaves both as a moral science 
and as a value-free technique.  
Finally, the rejection of the false dichotomy of the two facets of economics also 
allows revisiting the debate with which we start the paper, ‘where did economics 
originate from?’ Now, with the dual identity of economics in mind, we can illuminate 
the origin(s) of the discipline by analogy with biological reproduction: Ethics and 
engineering are nothing but two parents, who gave birth to economics and had since 
then transmitted their attributes, morality and value neutrality respectively, to their 
common child. Plainly, it is not an account from the perspective of the history of 
economic thought, but a methodological explanation through the clues underlying the 
very nature of that child.  
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